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The advent of increased world tensions has produced peculiar circum-
stances unanticipated by even the most accurate clairvoyant. A predica-
ment has confronted the Supreme Court in regard to civilian dependents
and employees accompanying the armed forces to their overseas bases.
In most areas of military operation, treaties with foreign nations have
allowed the United States jurisdiction of those Americans based there.
Legislation has provided that: "Subject to the provisions of any treaty
or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party or to any
accepted rule of international law, all persons serving with, employed
by, or accompanying the armed forces without the continental limits of the
United States . . ."' are subject to military jurisdiction. Beginning in
1956, the Court has been faced with a series of five cases, two involving
dependents and three involving employees of the armed forces stationed
in foreign lands. 2
In all five cases the defendants were tried, convicted, and sentenced
by military tribunals. Defendants asserted lack of jurisdiction by the
court and applied for writs of habeas corpus, basing the application on
the premise that they could not be subjected to the foreign jurisdiction
under the existing treaties and that as civilian citizens of the United
States were guaranteed their rights under the Constitution to indictment
by grand jury3 and trial by jury.4 All five opinions affirmed the de-
fendants' allegations.
However, the opinions lacked unanimity. The issue, on the surface,
would appear to be whether citizens accompanying the armed forces as
150 U.S.C.A. S 552 (11) (Supp., 1959).
2 Kinsella v. United States, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); McElroy v. United States, 361 U.S. 281
(1960); Wilson v. Bohlender, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278
(1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
8 U.S. Const., Amendment V which provides: "No person shall be held to answer
for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when
in actual service in time of War or public danger .... "
4 U.S. Const., Amendment VI which provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed....
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dependents and employees are considered part of the military. In four
cases,5 a thin majority of five held them not to be in the military; the
initial case required a concurring opinion to enable a majority.6 Nu-
merous concurring and minority opinions were written. Why should
such a relatively simple issue cause so many varied opinions? The answer
is two-fold: First, since the facts presented were new and original, the
Court treated the situation as one of "first impression;" and second, the
Court was forced to review the established doctrine of separation of
powers.
By "first impression" it is meant that the factual situation which con-
fronted the Court involved cases whose events had no precedent opinions
upon which to base a decision. By this "first impression" the Court was
to determine from a purely factual point of view whether dependents
were to be given civilian or military status. The separation of powers
concept has been brought into play by implication, for if defendants
were considered as civilians, only jurisdiction by Article III courts would
be tolerated in deciding their constitutional rights.7 If, however, they
were to be classified as part of the military, Article I, Section 8, clauses
14 and 18 authorized congressional jurisdiction over them.8
In Reid v. Covert,9 the Supreme Court ruled that dependents have
civilian status and therefore are under the exclusive jurisdiction of
Article III courts. The Court in the four later cases adopted the Reid
opinion as to result and rationale. Basing its opinion on the separation
of powers doctrine, subservience of the military courts to civil law
courts and the protection of one's constitutional rights, the Court granted
petitioners' habeas corpus writs. Although the factual situation is of first
impression the problem is neither novel nor original. In Ex parte Milli-
gan,10 the Supreme Court maintained these same basic doctrines, but ap-
5 Kinsella v. United States, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); McElroy v. United States, 361 U.S.
281 (1960); Wilson v. Bohlender, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S.
278 (1960).
6 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
7 U.S. Const., Art. Il, S 2, cl. 3 provides: "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases
of Impeachment shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the
said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the
Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed."
8 U.S. Const. Art. I, S 8, cl. 14 provides: Congress is empowered "to make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." U.S. Const. Art. I,
S 8, el. 18 provides: Congress is "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof."
9 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
10 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
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plied them in an area distinct, but yet similar to the modern day cases.
The present Court, therefore, while not expressly so stating, has by
implication broadened and extended the ruling of Milligan to where it
now applies in an area foreign from its original concept.
EX PARTE MILLIGAN-THE LANDMARK
A brief history of court-martial proceedings prior to the Milligan
decision will be helpful. In 1806, the Court held that a military tribunal
had no jurisdiction over a civilian never in the militia.1 In Dynes v.
Hoover,12 Dynes, a Navy seaman, was tried before a military tribunal
for desertion. He was found not guilty, but guilty of attempted deser-
tion. Not being specifically charged with that crime, Dynes, on habeas
corpus, petitioned the Supreme Court. The Court upheld the conviction,
stating that Congress under the Constitution had the power to regulate
the Navy and Army, part of which included disciplinary measures, but
warned that a court-martial was to be "called into existence for a special
and limited purpose and to perform a particular duty."'13 This upheld
the doctrine originally expressed in Anderson v. Dunn,14 wherein the
Court stated that military tribunals should be given "the least possible
powers adequate to the end proposed."'15
Three years prior to Milligan, the Court ruled it could inquire into
the record of a court-martial only as regards jurisdiction over the per-
son, subject matter and punishment involved in the controversy.'6 Thus
prior to Milligan, it was determined: That no civilian could be subjected
to military rule in the United States; that Congress had the power through
legislative courts to act against military violators; and that the Supreme
Court could only interfere wherein the jurisdiction of the person or sub-
ject matter was at issue.
In Ex parte Milligan,17 a civilian citizen of Indiana was arrested by the
military during the Civil War. Such power was authorized by congres-
sional act. It was claimed by the Union that because of the rebellion and
the threat of imminent invasion that it was imperative for the protection
of the country that the army act in arresting Milligan. At the time of the
11 Wise v. Withers, 3 Cr. (U.S.) 331 (1806).
1261 U.S. 65 (1857). Accord: In re Spencer, 40 Fed. 149 (D. Kan., 1889); In re
Zimmerman, 30 Fed. 176 (N.D. Cal., 1887).
Is Hoover v. Dynes, 61 U.S. 65,67 (1857).
14 6 Wheat. (U.S.) 204 (1821).
15 Ibid., at 231.
16 Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243 (1863). See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946);
Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. 65 (1857).
17 71 US. 2 (1866).
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arrest, all civil courts in the vicinity were open and functioning. Because
of this fact, the Court granted a writ of habeas corpus and held that
as long as civil courts were open and operating, military tribunals had
no jurisdiction over civilians.' The Constitution provides that the judi-
ciary powers under Article III are to secure the protection of federal laws.
It was quite evident to the Court that military tribunals were not granted
any power under Article III and, as a result, were subservient to Article
III courts in the determination of one's basic rights. No congressional
act could dictate otherwise.
The power of punishment is, alone through the means which the law have [sic]
provided for that purpose and if they are ineffectual, there is an immunity from
punishment no matter how great an offender the individual may be, or how
much his crimes may have shocked the sense of justice of the country, or en-
dangered its safety. By the protection of the law, human rights are secured;
withdraw that protection, and they are at the mercy of wicked rulers or the
clamor of an excited people. 19
Acts of Congress under their Article I powers are for legislative pur-
poses only. Any overextension of their powers into those reserved for
the judiciary under Article III threatens the separation of powers doc-
trine which is an integral part of our government system and, as a
result, such acts are unconstitutional.
Article III courts are the roots from which the tree of justice flourished.
The protection of citizens under the Constitution is exclusively a matter
for civil determination and any exercise by any branch of the govern-
ment other than the judiciary will not be tolerated. Military tribunals
are a creature of Congress. Under Article I, these legislative courts are
allowed to function, but are restricted in their application. Only those
parties connected with the military are subject to its jurisdiction. At all
times civilians are entitled to the use of civil courts in the determination
of their rights and obligations. Being a civilian, Milligan was due his day
in a civilian court. In short, civilians are not to be subjected to court-
martial jurisdiction.
The Court made an exception to this rule, but restricted it to a narrow
area. The government argued that because of the threatened invasion of
Confederate troops, martial law should be extended. The Court ruled
that martial law could apply only when civil courts were closed as a
result of actual attack or invasion. If civil administration was inoperative,
then military tribunals could have jurisdiction over civilians in order to
maintain law and order, which would, in effect, prevent vandalism and
18 The facts of Milligan and Vallandigham are almost identical, but were decided
differently, the reason being that during Vallandigham the Civil War had not been
decided.
19 Ex parte Milligan, 71 V.s, 2,119 (1866).
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damage to civilian property. Only absolute necessity would allow martial
law to exist and then only "on the theatre of active military operations,
where war really prevails. . . Martial rule can never exist where the
courts are open, in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdic-
tion." 20 Such an exercise of power could not be a sham. "Martial law
cannot arise from a threatened invasion. The necessity must be actual
and present; the invasion real, such as effectually closes the civil courts
and deposes the civil administration." 21
The two courts cannot exist simultaneously where constitutional rights
are involved. One must give way to the other. By reason of the Con-
stitution itself, Article III courts are the protectors of constitutional
rights and therefore superior to the military tribunals. The logic behind
such a result is quite evident, for ". . . surely an ordained and established
court was better able to judge of this [evidence] than a military tribunal
composed of gentlemen not trained to the profession of law." 22 The
military was to remain subservient to civil administration to avoid the
possibility of despotic government. The Supreme Court said in a later
case that affirmed the military's secondary role in judicial rulings:
[T]he military should always be kept in subjection to the laws of the country
to which it belongs, and that he is no friend of the Republic who advocates
the contrary. The established principle of every free people is, that the law
shall alone govern; and to it the military must always yield. 28
EXTENSION OF THE MILLIGAN DOCTRINE IN RECENT CASES
During World War II and up to the present day, numerous disputes
of this nature have arisen. In each instance the Court has not expressly
extended Milligan's doctrine, but the effects of its decisions has been
an application of Milligan principles. Mr. Justice Murphy, in Duncan v.
Kabanamoku,24 recognized this effect and stated that Milligan should be
applied to United States territories as well. This concurring opinion has
been the only opinion of the Court, of all its post-war decisions, ex-
pressly adhering to the Milligan decision. In the Duncan case, petitioners
applied for and were granted writs of habeas corpus. One petitioner
was employed in the Naval Yards and the other was a resident civilian
of Hawaii when arrested and convicted by the military. At the time of
the court-martial, the civil courts had been open eight months and two
years respectively, having originally been closed because of Pearl Harbor.
201Ibid., at 127.
21Ibid. 22bid.
28 Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 169 (1879). See McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp.
80 (E.D., Va., 1943); Hines v. Mikill, 259 Fed. 28 (C.C.A. 4th, 1919).
24 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Mr. Justice Black stated that military law was looked upon with ab-
horrence and that, as a result, military trials of civilians charged with
crimes, especially when not made subject to judicial review, were con-
trary to our political traditions and our institution of jury trials in courts
of law.
Justice Murphy, as previously stated, found that Milligan should apply.
Only when a foreign invasion or civil war actually closes the courts and renders
it impossible for them to administer criminal justice can martial law validly be
invoked to suspend their functions. 25
Obviously the courts were functioning and, therefore, no jurisdiction
over civilians was allowed to the military under the separation of powers
doctrine.
Madsen v. Kinsela 26 was the first case where a dependent overseas was
convicted of a crime by a military tribunal. The petitioner was found
guilty of murdering her husband, a serviceman stationed in Germany.
The Court refused to issue the habeas corpus writ. Since the crime oc-
curred during the occupation of Germany, the Court's decision was
based on the "war action" rather than on petitioner's citizenship status.
The Court reasoned that without the occupation of allied forces in
Germany, no semblance of law and order could exist. As in Milligan,
military rule was allowed over civilians until a stable civil administration
could be created to displace the military. Unlike Milligan, however, this
involved jurisdiction in a foreign country. By dicta, the Court created
a paradox which left unsettled questions for further determination. The
dicta was: "The policy of Congress to refrain from legislating in this
unchartered area does not imply its lack of power to legislate" 27 over
dependents in foreign countries in peacetime. By recognizing Congress's
power to legislate in this field, if it so desired, the Court contradicted
Milligan, for Milligan outlawed any congressional attempts to transfer
the jurisdiction over civilian rights to any court other than those estab-
lished by Article III.
Mr. Justice Black wrote a separate opinion refusing to recognize
Congress' military power to create such courts to rule on American
citizens overseas. During wartime such court-martial jurisdiction could
exist under Milligan, but Justice Black was reluctant to extend such jur-
isdiction to post-war trials.
25 Ibid, at 326.
26343 U.S. 341 (1952). See Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260 (1909). Cf. Hira-
bayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
27 Madsen v Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 348, 349 (1952).
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In Toth v. Quarles,28 Toth, having been honorably discharged, was
'arrested by the military in Pittsburgh and flown to Korea. Court-martial
proceedings were brought for acts allegedly committed by Toth while
in the service. This power to try Toth was derived from the Uniform
Code of Military Justice.29 Justice Black declared such power uncon-
stitutional. Abhorring the extension of jurisdiction to military tribunals,
he asserted that only Article III courts had jurisdiction over Toth. That
once "'a person [is] separated from the service, [he] ceases to be amena-
ble' to military and naval jurisdiction."30
As in Milligan, the Court could find nothing in the history of con-
stitutional treatment of military tribunals which entitles them to rank
along with Article III courts as adjudicators of the guilt or innocence of
people. Therefore, Toth, like any other United States civilian, was to be
entitled to the safeguards guaranteed him through the processes of Article
III courts.
The majority again defined the basis upon which the military courts
function. The role of the armed forces was to protect our nation, and
to do so, it required tight disciplinary controls. Such disciplinary con-
trols are the primary reason for military tribunals and the Court could
not comprehend how the "discipline of the Army [was] going to be
disrupted, its morale impaired . . . by giving ex-servicemen the benefits
of a civilian court trial when they are actually civilians....
Reid v. Covert32 involved two decisions. Petitioners living in Japan and
England were convicted by military courts of murdering their soldier
husbands. Treaties existing with Japan and England precluded their civil
administration of jurisdiction over American citizens stationed at military
bases. Such jurisdiction was bestowed upon the military by congressional
act,33 i.e., all American citizens stationed at United States overseas bases
were under the complete judicial control of the base commander. Peti-
tioners asserted denial of their constitutional rights under Article III
Section 2, the Fifth and the Sixth Amendments.
28 350 US. 11 (1955). For further discussion of Toth v. Quarles, consult 5 De Paul L.
Rev. 121 (1955). Cf. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210 (1949); Kahn v. Anderson, 255
U.S. 1 (1921); Ex parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696 (1881). Contra: Ex parte Joly, 290 Fed.
858 (S.D.N.Y., 1922); Terry v. United States, 2. F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Wash, 1933).
29 50 U.S.C.A. S 553 (a) (1950). This clause provides: "[Alny person charged with
having committed, while in a status in which he was subject to this chapter, an offense
against this chapter, punishable by confinement of five years or more and for which
the person cannot be tried in the courts of the United States ... shall not be relieved
from amenability to trial by courts-martial by reason of the termination of said status."
80 Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 US. 210, 216 (1949).
81 Toth v. Quarles, 350 US. 11, 22 (1955).
32 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
33 50 U.S.C.A. S 552 (11) (Supp., 1957).
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As noted before, the Court was faced with a factual situation calling
for a "first impression" decision. A basis for such a ruling was to be had,
therefore, from other categories of constitutional law.
Four cases provided the Court with a foundation for the first Reid
opinion. In re Ross34 tested the validity of Consular Courts created by
Congress to try American citizens in foreign lands. Ross was convicted
of murder by this court, and petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
habeas corpus. The Court denied the writ.
By the Constitution a government is ordained and established "for the United
States of America," and not for countries outside their limits against accusation
of capital or infamous crimes, except by indictment or presentment by a grand
jury, and for an impartial trial by a jury when thus accused, apply only to
citizens and others within the United States .... The Constitution can have no
operation in another country.3 5
Therefore petitioners in Reid would not be guaranteed their constitu-
tional rights since they were entitled to none.
The Insular cases3 6 were another bases which the Court used to furnish
a foundation for their decision. In these cases the Supreme Court found
that the Constitution was not, in and of itself, applicable to United States
territories even though an American possession. Only federal legislation
could apply the guarantees of the Constitution in territories outside the
Union of States. It would naturally follow, stated the Court, that since
the Congress could institute laws in such territories, it could also create
legislative courts to adjudicate those laws.
Thus, after deciding that petitioners were part of the armed forces,
the Court in Reid ruled:
These cases [Insular and Ross] establish .. .that the Constitution does not
require trial before an Article III court in a foreign country for offenses com-
mitted there by an American citizen and that Congress may establish legislative
courts for this purpose.87
The effect of this decision gave Congress through its legislative courts,
jurisdiction over citizens' constitutional rights.
Upon rehearing of Reid, the prior majority was overruled. Mr. Justice
34 140 U.S. 4S3 (1891).
85 Ibid., at 464.
3GBalzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138
(1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244
(1901).
37 Kinsella v. Kruegar, 351 U.S. 470, 476 (1956). Cf. Ex parte Bakelite, 279 U.S. 438,
449 (1929), where the Court held: "[It long has been settled that Article III does not
express the full authority of Congress to create courts, and that other Articles invest
Congress with powers in the exertion of which it may create inferior courts and clothe
them with functions deemed essential or helpful in carrying these powers into execu-
tion."$
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Black returned to Duncan and Toth as the basis for petitioners not being
classified as part of the armed forces. Black reaffirmed the subjection of
martial justice to the civil law and the separation of powers doctrine.
[T]he jurisdiction of military tribunals is a very limited and extraordinary
jurisdiction [and] was intended to be only a narrow exception to the normal
and preferred method of trial in courts of law. Every extension of military
jurisdiction is an encroachment on the Jurisdiction of the Civil Courts .... 8
If military jurisdictional powers are to be limited, then Article I, Section
8, Clause 14 is to be narrowly construed and is to apply only to "the land
and Naval forces." The necessary and proper powers of Congress could
not, therefore, apply "to any group of persons beyond that class described
in Clause 14." 9 Only those actually in the armed forces could be sub-
jected to the powers given to Congress.
Since neither Toth nor any ex-serviceman could be tried by court
martial, certainly dependents also would be exempt. Ex-servicemen
should be considered more closely connected to the military than de-
pendents. Justice Black, by adopting Toth, reiterated that the military
court "emphasizes the iron hand of discipline more than it does the even
scales of justice; '40 notwithstanding the recent reforms, military trial
does not give an accused the same protection which exists in civil courts.
The government, as in Milligan, alleged that this was a mere exception
to the rule and that because of world tensions, the armies were "in the
field" of threatened warfare and the court should allow military jurisdic-
tion over citizens associated with the armed forces. The court rejected
their contention, declaring that such action is an extraordinary jurisdic-
tion and it should not be expanded at the expense of the Bill of Rights.
The Court would not allow such encroachment.
The attitude appears to be that a slight encroachment on the Bill of Rights
and other safeguards in the Constitution need cause little concern .... Slight
encroachments create new boundaries from which legions of power can seek
nnw territory to capture .... 41
To the Court, such powers were extended to the military, which allowed
the commanding officer at each base executive, legislative and judicial
powers. Such powers in our society are the very acme of absolutism,
which would lead to the destruction of the Bill of Rights.
The opinion of the Court was concurred in by four Justices. Two
concurring opinions were needed to constitute a majority. These opin-
ions, however, were founded on the prior Reid Case. The concurring
Court stated that Congress's powers under Article I were applicable to
38 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 21 (1957) (emphasis supplied).
39 Ibid., at 21.
40 Ibid., at 38. 41 Ibid., at 39.
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petitioners since they were to be included as members of the armed
forces: "[U]nder the Constitution, the mere absence of a prohibition
against an asserted power, plus the abstract reasonableness of its use, is
enough to establish the existence of the [congressional] power."42 But
to the concurring Justices, capital offense crimes were so unusual that
an exception to the Congress's power could be applied. Because of their
serious nature and rare existence, constitutional guarantees under Article
III courts were to be given the petitioners. As a result of this reasoning
and because these opinions were needed to produce a majority, the ques-
tion remained as to a dependent's fate for a non-capital crime.
Three cases involving employees convicted of capital and non-capital
offenses by courts-martial were recently decided by the Court.43 The
claim of the government was two-fold: One, the Reid decision was
applicable only to dependents involved in capital crimes; and two, the
clause declared unconstitutional by the Reid Court applied only to that
particular situation and, therefore, dependents convicted of non-capital
crimes and employees convicted of all crimes were still subject to military
jurisdiction. 44 The Court ruled that such was not the fact and both em-
ployees and dependents were to be considered as civilians with the same
rights as petitioners in Reid. In all four cases, a majority of five or more
followed the doctrines expressed by Mr. Justice Black in the second
Reid opinion. The petitioners were to be considered civilians, for no
encroachment by the military will be allowed on Article III courts.
In Kinsella v. United States,45 a dependent was tried and convicted by
the military for manslaughter, a non-capital offense. Because of the think-
ing in concurring opinions in Reid, the government argued that military
jurisdiction over dependents was allowable. The Court, however, found
no basis for this argument. The Court, therefore, ruled that: "[T]he
materials furnished show that military jurisdiction has always been based
on the 'status' of the accused, rather than the nature of the offense. ' 46
Thus the doctrines in Reid were applicable in this case also.
The Court also pointed out the effects of the government's assertion;
that if it were allowed, the military could have jurisdiction over all by
reducing a capital offense to a non-capital crime. In effect, such a situa-
tion would nullify Reid.
42 Ibid., at 66.
43 An interesting note is that Mr. Justice Clark delivered the first Reid majority, the
second Reid minority and then reversed his view in writing the Kinsella, Wilson,
McElroy and Grisham majorities.
44 50 U.S.C.A. S 552 (11) (Supp., 1957).
45 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
46 Ibid., at 243.
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McElroy v. United States47 and Wilson v. Boblender4s involved non-
capital crimes committed by military employees stationed in foreign
bases. Grisham v. Hagan49 involved a like employee convicted of a capital
offense. Treaties barred jurisdiction by the foreign governments of those
accused. The Court decided that the doctrines of Reid in regard to em-
ployees were to be of the same effect as they were regarding dependents.
The cases presented by the government were found not in point since
they involved assistant paymasters of the Navy.50 This group had always
been treated by the Court as being an inherent part of the Navy.,' The
civilians involved in the three cases were not paymasters and therefore
could not be considered as an inherent part of the Navy. As a result, the
Reid doctrine was applied in all three cases and petitioners were granted
writs of habeas corpus.
SIMILARITIES BETWEEN REID AND MILLIGAN
The ramifications of the Madsen and the second Reid Decision with
its four subsequent corollary cases create an expansion of the Milligan
rule. Fear of military extension into the civil courts which influenced
the Court's reasoning in Milligan prompted the Reid Court to the same
conclusion. Separation of power and the reduction of military jurisdic-
tion were the two main foundations for both decisions.
The Reid Court did not express Milligan's Doctrine once it reached
the conclusion that petitioners were civilians, but when coupled with
the Madsen case, one can perceive the effects of Milligan. In Reid and
the four recently decided cases, the Court pointed out that their rulings
applied only during the time of peace. Madsen allowed military jurisdic-
tion of civilians during a period of "war" when operation by civil courts
was near impossible. One of the government's basic contentions in Reid
was that because of such world tensions jurisdiction should rest in the
military. It should also be noted here that one petitioner in Reid was
living in Japan during the Korean War. As a result, therefore, the two
cases have now created a situation in foreign jurisdictions whereby the
military has jurisdiction of civilians in the actual locale of "war," but not
in the immediate area of war (Korea), or at a time when war is
threatened.
47 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
48 Ibid.
49 361 U.S. 278 (1960).
5 O Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109 (1895); Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879). See In
re Varney, 141 F. Supp., 190 (S.D. Cal., 1956).
51 United States v. Hendee, 124 U.S. 309 (1888); In re Bogart, 3 Fed. Cas. No. I, 596
(D. Cal., 1873).
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The government in both Milligan and Reid argued the need for ex-
pediency of trial in this situation as ground for allowing military juris-
diction of a civilian. The reply from either case could be sufficient in
both cases to answer this assertion. The Reid Court said:
The concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections against
arbitrary government are inoperative when they become inconvenient or when
expediency dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to
flourish would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the
basis of our government. 52
The Milligan Court in like language held that all citizens
[A]re guaranteed the inestimable privilege of trial by jury. This privilege is
a vital principle, underlying the whole administration of criminal justice; it is
not held by sufferance, and cannot be frittered away on any plea of state or
political necessity. When peace prevails ... there is no difficulty of preserving
the safeguards of liberty .... [T]hese safeguards need, and should receive, the
watchful care of those intrusted with the guardianship of the Constitution and
laws. In no other way can we transmit to posterity unimpaired the blessings of
liberty .... 53
Other sections of the opinions are similar, especially in the areas in-
volving the purpose of military law and the fear of the founding fathers
of military dominance. The MUlligan Court observed: "The discipline
necessary to the efficiency of the army and navy, required other and
swifter modes of trial than are furnished by the common law courts .... 54
Mr. Justice Black in Reid wrote: "Because of its very nature and purpose
the military must place great emphasis on discipline and efficiency. Cor-
respondingly, there has always been less emphasis in the military on pro-
tecting the rights of the individual than in civilian society and civilian
courts." 55
In regard to our founding fathers' intention, Justice Black stated that
any wide interpretation of Article I, Section 8, Clauses 14 and 18 "would
be at war with the well-established purpose of the Founders to keep the
military strictly within its proper sphere, subordinate to civil authority." 56
Justice Davis in Milligan held that the purpose of the Constitution and
the men who framed it was to guard "the foundations of civil liberty
against the abuses of unlimited power ....
In both cases, the Court maintained the supremacy of Article III
courts and the protection of the individual's rights guaranteed by the
52 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957).
53 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 123,124 (1866).
54 Ibid., at 123.
55 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 36 (1957).
56 Ibid., at 30.
57 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 126, (1866).
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Constitution. By constitutional interpretation, the protection needed to
guarantee these rights is accomplished by Article III courts only and
no others. The Milligan Court had no problem in deciding whether
petitioner was a civilian or not. The argument used for deciding that
petitioners in Reid were civilians is the same as Milligan, namely, as stated
before, the subservience of military courts and the separation of powers
doctrine-meaning that no Article I legislative court could decide judicial
matters which solely belonged in Article III courts. Milligan stated that
no civilian residing in a state of the Union could be subjected to military
jurisdiction in time of peace. Reid provided the same for civilians over-
seas where existing treaties prevented foreign jurisdiction of civilians at
military bases. In time of war, Milligan allowed military jurisdiction of
civilians only when and where actual war existed. Reid with Madsen pro-
vided for the same jurisdiction over civilians where actual war existed
in a foreign jurisdiction.
Both the minority of Reid and the concurring opinion of Milligan
refused to adopt this theory. In Milligan, the concurring Justices believed
that Congress by its Article I powers could allow military jurisdiction
over civilians. The Court said:
[I]t is within the power of Congress to determine in what states or districts
such great and imminent public danger exists as justifies the authorization of
military tribunals for the trial of crimes and offences against the discipline or
security of the army or against public safety.58
As seen before, the Reid minority adopted the same position.
CONCLUSION
Treaties releasing American civilians from foreign litigation and the
unconstitutionality of military jurisdiction over them have created a
jurisdictional vacuum. Since no Article III courts are established in those
foreign lands, how can the accused be extended his constitutional
privileges? The Court emphasized that this was a political question, but
offered alternatives which Congress might adopt. The Court suggested
that in cases involving employees, legislation be enacted to induct them
into the military, much the same as doctors and dentists. In regard to all
civilians overseas under military auspices, three suggestions were of-
fered. One was to bring the civilians back to the United States for trial,
but this would create havoc because of the transportation of witnesses
and the accused. The other two alternatives are more feasible. The
Court suggested that regardless of the treaty, such civilians could be
extradited into the foreign courts.5 9 The objection to this proposal is
5 Ibid., at 140.
59 Cf. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
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that an American civilian would be subjected to a jurisdiction and
procedure completely unknown to him. Ignorance of this could deprive
the accused of a fair trial. Creation by Congress of foreign federal
courts is the third alternative. If treaties exist which create these juris-
dictional vaccums, they would be directed to these courts and the Su-
preme Court has upheld Congress' power to so provide. 60
Regardless of the congressional decision, Reid has extended the Milligan
application to include this narrow field. Once again the Courts have pro-
tected the individuals' rights and their jurisdictional province from
congressional encroachment. All that need be said was said over one
hundred and fifty years ago:
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall
never exercise the executive and judicial powers or either of them: the executive
shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers or either of them: the
judiciary shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of
them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not men. 61
60 Ex parte Bakelite, 279 U.S. 438 (1929); American Insurance v. 356 Bales of Cotton,
26 U.S. 511 (1828).
61 Mass. Const. Art. XXX.
LACHES IN ADMIRALTY ACTIONS
The length of time during which an action may be brought by a sea-
man for personal injury is governed by the admiralty doctrine of laches,
unlike ordinary common law actions which are generally strictly gov-
erned by statutes of limitations.' The seaman who is injured or becomes
ill in the service of the ship has three basic remedies against the owner
of the ship: (1) An action for maintenance and cure which will allow
him to recover his wages until the end of the voyage, his expenses for
lodging and medical expenses he has incurred for cure. (2) An action for
unseaworthiness should he be injured through the unseaworthiness of the
vessel. (3) An action under the Jones Act for negligence of the owner
of the vessel or his servants.2 Laches is applied somewhat differently
1 Gardner v. Panama R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 29 (1951); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S.
392 (1946); Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919); The Key City, 14
Wall. (U.S.) 653 (1871).
2 E.g., The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903). Justice Brown stated that the law was
settled in these four propositions:
"1. That the vessel and her owners are liable, in case a seaman falls sick, or is
wounded, in the service of the ship, to the extent of his maintenance and cure, and
to his wages, at least so long as the voyage is continued.
"2. That the vessel and her owner are, both by English and American law, liable to
an indemnity for injuries received by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of
